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Go¨del–Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorems
for Non–Recursively Enumerable Theories
Abstract
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily
recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions; one is the consistency of
a theory with the set of all true Πn-sentences or equivalently the Σn-soundness of the theory, and
the other is n-consistency the restriction of ω-consistency to the Σn-formulas. It is also shown that
Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem does not generally hold for definable non-recursively enumerable
theories; whence Go¨del-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem is optimal in a sense. Though the proof of
the incompleteness theorem using the Σn-soundness assumption is constructive, it is shown that there
is no constructive proof for the incompleteness theorem using the n-consistency assumption, for n>2.
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1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem is usually taken to be the incompleteness of the first order theory of
Peano Arithmetic PA. While PA is not a complete theory, the theorem states much more than that. One
of the most misleading ways for stating the theorem is: any sound theory containing PA is incomplete,
where a theory is called sound when all its axioms are true in the standard model of natural numbers
N. A quick counterexample for this statement, often asked by new learners of the incompleteness, is
that but the theory of true arithmetic Th(N) is complete?!, where Th(N) is the set of sentences that
are true in the standard model of natural numbers. Of course, the obvious answer is that Th(N) is not
recursively enumerable (re for short). So, the right rewording of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem
in its (weaker) semantic form is that any sound and re theory containing PA is incomplete. Now, a
natural second question is: what about non-re theories (that are sound and contain PA)? Again the same
obvious answer shows up: Th(N) is not re (by the very theorem of Go¨del’s first incompleteness) and is
complete. So, the question of the incompleteness of non-re theories should come down to more specific
ones, at least to finitely representable theories, or, as the logicians say, definable ones. Hence, do we
have the incompleteness of definable theories (which are sound and contain PA)? This question has been
answered affirmatively in the literature; see e.g. [15] or [12]. Go¨del’s original first incompleteness theorem
did not assume the soundness of the theory in question, and he used the notion of ω-consistency for that
purpose. Later it was found out that the weaker notion of 1-consistency suffices for the theorem (see e.g.
[3] or [13]). By generalizing this equivalent notion to higher degrees (Πn in general) we will prove some
generalizations of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem for definable theories below. Finally, Rosser’s Trick
proves Go¨del’s result without assuming the 1-consistency of the theory. So, Go¨del-Rosser’s Incompleteness
Theorem, assuming only the consistency of the theory, states that any consistent and re theory containing
PA is incomplete. It is tempting to weaken the condition of recursive enumerability of the theory in this
theorem; but we will see below that this is not possible. We can thus argue that Go¨del-Rosser’s theorem
is optimal in a sense.
1.1 Some Notation and Conventions
We fix the following notation and conventions (mostly from [2, 3, 6, 13, 15]). Fix a language of arithmetic,
like {0, S,+,×,6} (as in [2]) or {0, 1,+,×, <} (as in [6]).
• For any natural number n ∈ N the term n represents this number in the fixed arithmetical language
(which could be S · · ·S(0) or 1 + · · · + 1 [n-times]). For a fixed Go¨del numbering of syntax, pαq
denotes the Go¨del number of the object α; when there is no ambiguity we will write simply pαq for
the term pαq. Any Go¨del numbering consists of coding sequences; if m is the code of a sequence,
then the formula Seq(m) expresses this fact, and its length is denoted by `en(m) and for any number
l<`en(m) the lth member of m is denoted by [m]l. A sequence m is thus 〈[m]0, [m]1, · · · , [m]`en(m)−1〉;
and for any k 6 `en(m), the initial segment of m with length k is denoted by 〈m  k〉, that is
〈[m]0, [m]1, · · · , [m]k−1〉. Note that 〈m  0〉 = ∅ and 〈m  `en(m)〉 = m. If m is the Go¨del code
of a sentence, then Sent(m) expresses this fact. For a sequence of sentences like m, the formula
ConjSeq(k,m) means that “k is the (Go¨del code of the) conjunction of all the members of m”, i.e.,
k = p
∧
i<`en(m) ϕiq where [m]i = pϕiq. The propositional connectives may act (as numeral partial
functions) on natural numbers; for example ¬m for m ∈ N is p¬αq where m = pαq, and for any
◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→} and m, k ∈ N, m ◦ k = pα ◦ βq where m = pαq and k = pβq.
• The classes of formulas {Σn}n∈N and {Πn}n∈N are defined in the standard way [2, 6]: Σ0 = Π0 is the
class of bounded formulas (in which every universal quantifier has the form ∀x([x 6 t → · · · ] and
every existential quantifier has the form ∃x[x 6 t∧· · · ]), and the class Σn+1 contains the closure of Πn
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under the existential quantifiers, and is closed under disjunction, conjunction, existential quantifiers
and bounded universal quantifiers; similarly, the class Πn+1 contains the closure of Σn under the
universal quantifiers, and is closed under disjunction, conjunction, universal quantifiers and bounded
existential quantifiers. By definition ∆n = Σn∩Πn. Let us note that the negation of a Σn-formula is
a Πn-formula, and vice versa; and that the formulas Seq(−), Sent(−) and ConjSeq(−) can be taken
to be Σ0, and the functions `en(−), [−]− and 〈−−〉 are definable by Σ0-formulas.
• The set of all true arithmetical formulas is denoted by Th(N); that is {θ∈Sent | N |= θ}. Similarly,
for any n, Σn-Th(N) = {θ ∈ Σn-Sent | N |= θ} and Πn-Th(N) = {θ ∈ Πn-Sent | N |= θ}. While
by Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem the (Go¨del numbers of the members of the) set Th(N) is not
definable, for n > 0 the (Go¨del numbers of the members of the) set Σn-Th(N) is definable by the
Σn-formula Σn-True(x) (stating that “x is the Go¨del number of a true Σn-sentence”) and the (Go¨del
numbers of the members of the) set Πn-Th(N) is definable by the Πn-formula Πn-True(x) (stating
that “x is the Go¨del number of a true Πn-sentence”). Robinson’s Arithmetic is denoted by Q which
is a weak (induction-free) fragment of PA.
• A definable theory is the set of all logical consequences of a set of sentences that (the set of the
Go¨del numbers of its members) is definable by an arithmetical formula AxiomsT (x) [meaning that x
is the Go¨del number of an axiom of T ]. The formula ConjAxT (x) states that “x is the Go¨del code of a
formula which is a conjunction of some axioms of T”, i.e., x = p
∧ `
i=1 ϕiq where
∧ `
i=1 AxiomsT (pϕiq).
The proof predicate of first order logic is denoted by Proof(y, x) which is a Σ0-formula stating that
“y is the code of a proof of the formula with code x in the first order logic”. So, for a definable theory
T the provability predicate of T is the formula ProvT (x) = ∃y, z
[
ConjAxT (z)∧Proof(y, z → x)
]
; also
the consistency predicate of T is Con(T ) = ¬ProvT (p0 6= 0q). Let us note that ProvT defines the
set of T -provable formulas, the deductive closure of (the axioms of) T . For a class of formulas Γ
the theory T is called Γ-definable when AxiomsT ∈ Γ. Let us also note that if AxiomsT ∈ Σn+1 or
AxiomsT ∈Πn then ConjAxT ∈Σn+1 or ConjAxT ∈Πn, respectively, and so in either case ProvT ∈Σn+1.
• Theory T decides the sentence ϕ when either T ` ϕ or T ` ¬ϕ. A theory is called complete when
it can decide every sentence in its language. A theory T is called Γ-deciding when it can decide any
sentence in Γ. In the literature, a theory T is called Γ-complete when for any sentence ϕ ∈ Γ, if
N |= ϕ then T ` ϕ. Note that if a sound theory is Γ-deciding then it is Γ-complete. A theory T
is called ω-consistent when for no formula ϕ both the conditions (i) T ` ¬ϕ(n) for all n∈N, and
(ii) T ` ∃xϕ(x) hold together. It is called n-consistent when for no formula ϕ∈Σn with ϕ = ∃xψ(x)
and ψ ∈ Πn−1 one has (i) T ` ¬ψ(n) for all n ∈ N, and (ii) T ` ϕ. Theory T is called Γ-Sound,
when for any sentence ϕ∈Γ, if T ` ϕ then N |= ϕ. For example, any consistent theory containing
Πn-Th(N) is Σn-sound. Let us note that, since Th(N) is a complete and thus a maximally consistent
theory, the soundness of T is equivalent to Th(N) ⊆ T and to the consistency of T + Th(N). In
general, for any consistent extension T of Q, the Σn-soundness of T is equivalent to the consistency
of T + Πn-Th(N) (cf. Theorems 26,31 of [3]). Also, for any T ⊇ Q, since Q is a Σ1-complete theory,
the consistency of T is equivalent to the consistency of T + Π0-Th(N), i.e. Con
(
T + Π0-Th(N)
)
,
which, in turn, is equivalent to the Σ0-soundness of T (cf. Theorem 5 of [3]).
Semantic Condition Conventional Notation Syntactic Condition
(Σ∞)Soundness of T ≡ N |= T ≡ Con
(
T+[Π∞]Th(N)
)
Σn-Soundness of T ≡ ——— ≡ Con
(
T + Πn-Th(N)
)
Σ1-Soundness of T ≡ 1-Con(T ) ≡ Con
(
T + Π1-Th(N)
)
Σ0-Soundness of T ≡ Con(T ) ≡ Con
(
T + Π0-Th(N)
)
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1.2 Some Earlier Attempts and Results
By Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, PA (and every re extension of it) is not Π1-complete; then what
about S = PA+ Π1-Th(N)? Is this theory complete? For sure, it is Π1-complete and Σ1-complete; but can
it be, say, Π2-complete? Let us note that S is a Π1-definable theory; i.e. AxiomsS ∈ Π1, and so ProvS ∈ Σ2.
So, it is natural to ask if the incompleteness phenomena still hold for definable arithmetical theories.
1.2.1 Results of Jeroslow (1975)
Jeroslow [5] showed in 1975 that when the set of theorems of a consistent theory that contains PA is
∆2-definable, then it cannot contain the set of all true Π1-sentences.
Jeroslow (1975) : PA ⊆ T & ProvT ∈∆2 & Con(T ) =⇒ Π1-Th(N) 6⊆ T
This result casts a new light on a classical theorem on the existence of a ∆2-definable complete extension
of PA (see [14]): no such complete extension can contain all the true Π1-sentences. Note that one cannot
weaken the assumption ProvT ∈∆2 in the theorem, to, say, ProvT ∈Σ2 because e.g. for the theory S above
we have ProvS∈Σ2 and Π1-Th(N) ⊆ S.
1.2.2 Results of Ha´jek (1977)
Jeroslow’s theorem was generalized by Ha´jek ([1]) who showed that when the set of theorems of a consistent
theory that contains PA is ∆n-definable, then it cannot be Πn−1-complete:
Ha´jek (1977) : PA ⊆ T & ProvT ∈∆n & Con(T ) =⇒ Πn−1-Th(N) 6⊆ T
Another result of Ha´jek ([1]) is that if a deductively closed extension of PA is Πn-definable and n-consistent,
then it cannot be Πn−1-complete:
Ha´jek (1977a) : PA ⊆ T & ProvT ∈Πn & n–Con(T ) =⇒ Πn−1-Th(N) 6⊆ T
He also showed that no such theory can be complete; i.e., when PA ⊆ T & ProvT ∈Πn & n–Con(T ) then T
is incomplete (indeed, a Πn-sentence is independent from T ). Here, we generalize this theorem by showing
the existence of an independent Πn−1-sentence:
Corollary 1.3 : PA ⊆ T & ProvT ∈Πn & n–Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−1-Deciding
Remark 1.1 (On the Proof of Theorem 2.5 in [1]) In Theorem 2.5 of [1] an n-consistent theory T is
assumed to contain Peano Arithmetic (and be closed under deduction) and its set of theorems is assumed
to be Πn-definable for some n > 2. Then it is shown that (1) Πn−1-Th(N) 6⊆ T , and a proof is presented
for the fact that (2) T is incomplete.
In the proof of (1) for the sake of contradiction it is assumed that Πn−2-Th(N) ⊆ T ; and at the end of
the proof of (2) the inconsistency of T has been inferred from the T -provability of a false Πn−2-sentence
(denoted by τ1(p,m, ϕ) in [1]). Of course, when Πn−2-Th(N) ⊆ T then no false Πn−2-sentence is provable
in T . Probably, the proof did not intend to make use of the (wrong) assumption (of Πn−2-Th(N) ⊆ T );
rather the intention could have been using the completeness and n-consistency of T to show that T cannot
prove any false Πn−2-sentence. This is the subject of the next lemma (1.2) which fills an inessential minor
gap in the proof of [1, Theorem 2.5]. G
c© Saeed Salehi & Payam Seraji 2016 Sα∂Sα`~ıir
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
(S
u
b
m
it
t
e
d
)Go¨del–Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorems for non-re Theories page 5 (of 13)
The following lemma generalizes Theorem 20 of [3] which states that the true arithmetic Th(N) is the
only ω-consistent extension of PA (indeed Q) that is complete.
Lemma 1.2 (A Gap in the Proof of Theorem 2.5(2) in [1]) Any n-consistent and Πn-deciding ex-
tension of Q is Πn-complete.
Proof. By induction on n. For n = 0 there is nothing to prove. If the theorem holds for n then we prove
it for n + 1 as follows. If T is (n + 1)-consistent and Πn+1-deciding, but not Πn+1-complete, there must
exist some ψ∈Πn+1-Th(N) such that T 6` ψ. Write ψ = ∀zη(z) for some η∈Σn; then N |= η(m) for any
m∈N. By the induction hypothesis, T is Πn-complete and so Σn-complete; thus T ` η(m) for all m∈N.
On the other hand since T is Πn+1-deciding and T 6` ψ we must have T ` ¬ψ, thus T ` ∃z¬η(z). This
contradicts the (n+ 1)-consistency of T . o
Corollary 1.3 (Generalizing Theorem 2.5(2) of [1]) If the deductive closure of an n-consistent ex-
tension of PA is Πn-definable, then it has an independent Πn−1-sentence (for any n > 2).
Proof. If for a theory T we have PA ⊆ T and ProvT ∈Πn and n–Con(T ) then it cannot be Πn−1-deciding,
since otherwise by Lemma 1.2 (and (n − 1)-consistency of T ), Πn−1-Th(N) ⊆ T ; this is in contradiction
with Theorem 2.5(1) of [1] which states that Πn−1-Th(N) 6⊆ T under the above assumptions. o
Below we will give yet another generalization of the above corollary (and a result of [1]) in Corollary 2.6.
Ha´jek [1] has also showed that if the set of axioms of a consistent theory is Π1-definable and that theory
contains PA and all the true Π1-sentences, then it is not Π2-deciding. In Corollary 2.5 we will generalize
this result by showing that no consistent Πn-definable and Πn-complete extension of Q is Πn+1-deciding.
Corollary 2.5 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πn & Con(T ) & Πn-Th(N) ⊆ T =⇒ T 6∈ Πn+1-Deciding
1.2.3 Some Recent Attempts
In the result of Jeroslow (Theorem 2 of [5]) and Ha´jek’s generalizations (Theorem 2.5(1) and Theorem 2.8
of [1]) there is no incompleteness; we have only some non-inclusion (of the set of true Π1 or Πn sentences
in the theory). In the incompleteness theorems of Ha´jek ([1] and Corollaries 1.3 and 2.5) we had the,
somewhat strong, assumptions of n-consistency or Πn-completeness (with consistency). It is natural to
ask if we can weaken these assumptions (like in Rosser’s Trick) to mere consistency; and some attempts
[7, 4] have been made in this direction. Let us note that Rosserian (also Go¨delean) proofs make sense for
definable theories only (for example the undefinable theory Th(N) is complete) for the reason that when
a theory T is definable one can construct its provability predicate ProvT , and once one has a provability
predicate for T then it becomes a definable theory.
We note that the proofs of Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem for non-re theories given in [7, 4]
are both wrong; for the falsity of the argument of [7] one can see [10]; cf. also [8] and [11]. The falsity
of the proof of [4] is shown in the following remark (1.4). Unfortunately, there is no hope of extending
Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem to definable theories, even to Π1-definable ones; our Corollary 3.4
below shows that even a (consistent and) Π1-definable theory (extending Q) can be complete. This clashes
all the hopes for a general incompleteness phenomenon in the class of definable, and consistent, theories.
Remark 1.4 Unfortunately, the proof of Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem for non-re theories given
in [4] is wrong: In the proof of Lemma 3 in [4] the author uses the Diagonal Lemma for ¬F (x), where
F is constructed in Lemma S (Chapter VI) of [15] (together with its Lemma 2 in Chapter V); it can be
seen that F ∈Π1 and so A∈Σ1. If, as claimed in Lemma 3 (and Theorem and Corollary) of [4], for any
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Π1-definable consistent extension of Q there existed a Σ1-sentence A in ependent from it, then the theory
Q + Π1-Th(N) would have had a Π1-sentence independent from it. But it is well-known that this theory
is Σ1-complete and Π1-complete. So, the proof of the main theorem of [4] is flawed. In fact, the mistaken
step is in the proof of Lemma 2 where the author claims that “m1 can be chosen such that m2 6 m1 and
hence R(k,m2,Neg(n)).” But if we choose m1 arbitrarily large then the condition ∀x6m1R
(
k, x,Neg(n)
)
may not necessarily hold anymore. Indeed, Theorem 3.1 for n=0 is the negation of what is claimed in the
Abstract of [4]. G
2 Go¨del’s Theorem Generalized
2.1 Semantic Form of Go¨del’s Theorem
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem in its (weaker) semantic form states that no sound and re extension
of Q can be Π1-complete. Noting that a set is re if and only if it is Σ1-definable, this theorem can be
depicted as:
Go¨del’s 1st (Semantic) : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & N |= T =⇒ Π1-Th(N) 6⊆ T
A natural generalization of this theorem is the following (cf. Chapter III of [15], or Corollary 1 of [12]):
Theorem 2.1 No sound and Σn-definable (n>0) extension of Q can be Πn-complete.
Theorem 2.1 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & N |= T =⇒ Πn-Th(N) 6⊆ T
Proof. Suppose T is a sound extension of Q such that AxiomsT ∈ Σn. By Diagonal Lemma (see e.g. [2, 13])
there exists a sentence γ such that Q ` γ ←→ ¬ProvT (pγq). Obviously, γ ∈ Πn. We show that (†) N |= γ.
Since, otherwise (if N |= ¬γ then) there must exist some k,m ∈ N such that N |= ConjAxT (k) and
N |= Proof(m, k→pγq). Whence, T ` γ which contradicts the soundness of T . So, N |= γ. Now, we show
that T 6` γ. For the sake of contradiction, assume T ` γ. Then, by the compactness theorem, there are
some ϕ1, · · · , ϕl such that N |=
∧ l
i=1 AxiomsT (pϕiq) and `
∧ l
i=1 ϕi → γ. If m is the code of this proof and
k is the code of
∧ l
i=1 ϕi then N |= ConjAxT (k) ∧ Proof(m, k→pγq), or in other words N |= ProvT (pγq) so
N |= ¬γ contradicting (†) above. Thus, γ ∈ Πn-Th(N) \ T . o
Corollary 2.2 No sound and Πn-definable extension of Q can be Πn+1-complete.
Corollary 2.2 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πn & N |= T =⇒ Πn+1-Th(N) 6⊆ T
Proof. It suffices to note that any Πn-definable is also Σn+1-definable. o
Remark 2.3 It is well known that Q is Σ1-complete (see e.g. [2, 6, 13]) but not Π1-complete (by Go¨del’s
first incompleteness theorem, see e.g. [2, 6, 13]). So, Σ1-completeness does not imply Π1-completeness,
and in general, Σn-completeness does not imply Πn-completeness, since for example the Σn-complete and
sound theory Q + Σn-Th(N) is not Πn-complete by Theorem 2.1. On the other hand, Πn-completeness
(of any theory T ) implies (its) Σn-completeness, even (its) Σn+1-completeness: for any true Σn+1-sentence
∃x1, . . . , xkθ(x1, . . . , xk) with θ ∈ Πn there are n1, . . . , nk ∈ N such that N |= θ(n1, . . . , nk), and so
by Πn-completeness of T we have T ` θ(n1, . . . , nk) whence T ` ∃x1, . . . , xkθ(x1, . . . , xk). In symbols:
Πn-Th(N) ⊆ T =⇒ Σn+1-Th(N) ⊆ T (cf. [1, Lemma 2.2]). G
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2.2 General Form of Go¨del’s Theorem
The original form of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem states that a recursively enumerable extension
of Q which is ω-consistent cannot be Π1-deciding. This syntactic notion was introduced to take place
of the semantic notion of soundness. Later it was found out that Go¨del’s proof works with the weaker
assumption of 1-consistency which is equivalent to the consistency (of the theory) with Π1-Th(N) (see [3]):
Go¨del’s 1st (1931) : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & Con
(
T + Π1-Th(N)
)
=⇒ T 6∈ Π1-Deciding
A natural generalization of the theorem in this form is the Πn-undecidability of any Σn-definable extension
of Q which is consistent with Πn-Th(N); proved in Corollary 2.8 of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4 No Πn-definable extension of Q can be Πn+1-deciding if it is consistent with Πn-Th(N).
Theorem 2.4 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πn & Con
(
T + Πn-Th(N)
)
=⇒ T 6∈ Πn+1-Deciding
Proof. By Diagonal Lemma there exists a sentence γ such that
Q ` γ ←→ ∀u, z
(
∃x, y6u[〈x, y〉 = u ∧ Πn-True(x) ∧ ConjAxT (y) ∧ Proof(z, x∧y→pγq)]→
∃u′6u∃z′6z(∃x′, y′6u′[〈x′, y′〉 = u′ ∧ Πn-True(x′) ∧ ConjAxT (y′) ∧ Proof(z′, x′∧y′→p¬γq)])) (?)
where, 〈−,−〉 is an injective pairing (such as 〈u, v〉 = (u+ v)2 + u).
Obviously, γ ∈ Πn+1. We show that γ is independent from T ∗ = T + Πn-Th(N).
Put Ψ(u, z) = ∃x, y6u[〈x, y〉 = u ∧ Πn-True(x) ∧ ConjAxT (y) ∧ Proof(z, x∧y→pγq)] and
Ψ̂(u, z) = ∃x, y6u[〈x, y〉 = u ∧ Πn-True(x) ∧ ConjAxT (y) ∧ Proof(z, x∧y→p¬γq)].
Thus, (?) is now translated to
Q ` γ ←→ ∀u, z[Ψ(u, z)→ ∃u′6u∃z′6zΨ̂(u′, z′)]. (?′)
(T ∗ 6` γ): If T ∗ ` γ then there are ψ ∈Πn-Th(N) (note that Πn-Th(N) is closed under conjunction)
and a conjunction ϕ of the axioms of T such that ` ψ ∧ ϕ → γ. Let m be the Go¨del code of this
proof and let k = 〈pψq, pϕq〉. Now, we have N |= Ψ(k,m), and so by the Πn-completeness of T ∗ we
have T ∗ ` Ψ(k,m), thus by (?′), T ∗ ` ∃u′6k∃z′6mΨ̂(u′, z′). (‡)
On the other hand by the consistency of T ∗ we have T ∗ 6` ¬γ. So, for any q = 〈q1, q2〉, r ∈ N we have
that if N |= Πn-True(q1) ∧ ConjAxT (q2) then N |= ¬Proof(r, q1∧q2→p¬γq). Whence, N |= ¬Ψ̂(q, r)
holds for all q, r ∈ N in particular for all q 6 k, r 6 m; thus N |= ∀u′6k∀z′6m¬Ψ̂(u′, z′). Now,
∀u′6 k∀z′6m¬Ψ̂(u′, z′) is a true Σn-sentence and T ∗ is a Πn-complete theory; so by Remark 2.3,
T ∗ ` ∀u′6k∀z′6m¬Ψ̂(u′, z′) contradicting (‡) above!
(T ∗ 6` ¬γ): If T ∗ ` ¬γ then from (?′) it follows that
(i) T ∗ ` ∃u, z[Ψ(u, z) ∧ ∀u′6u∀z′6z¬Ψ̂(u′, z′)].
By the compactness theorem (applied to the deduction T ∗ ` ¬γ) there are k = 〈k1, k2〉,m∈N such
that N |= Πn-True(k1) ∧ ConjAxT (k2) ∧ Proof(m, k1∧k2→p¬γq). Below, we will show that
(ii) T ∗ ` ∀u, z[¬Ψ(u, z) ∨ ∃u′6u∃z′6zΨ̂(u′, z′)],
which contradicts (i) above. The proof of (ii) will be in three steps:
(1) T ∗ ` ∀u>k∀z>m[∃u′6u∃z′6zΨ̂(u′, z′)]
(2) T ∗ ` ∀u<k∀z[¬Ψ(u, z)]
(3) T ∗ ` ∀u∀z<m[¬Ψ(u, z)]
(1) Since Ψ̂(k,m) = ∃x, y6k[〈x, y〉 = k ∧ Πn-True(x) ∧ ConjAxT (y) ∧ Proof(m,x∧y→p¬γq)] is a
true Πn-sentence (for x = k1, y = k2), then T
∗ proves it, so (1) holds (for u′ = k, z′ = m).
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(2) It suffices to show T ∗ ` ∀z¬Ψ(i, z) for all i < k. Fix an i < k. If there are no i1, i2 such
that 〈i1, i2〉 = i then T ∗ ` ∀z¬Ψ(i, z) holds trivially; otherwise, fix i1, i2 with 〈i1, i2〉 = i. If
either ¬Πn-True(i1) or ¬ConjAxT (i2), then again T ∗ ` ∀z¬Ψ(i, z) holds. Finally, assume that
Πn-True(i1) ∧ ConjAxT (i2) is true. Then, by the consistency of T ∗ we have T ∗ 6` γ and so for
all p ∈ N we have N |= ¬Proof(p, i1∧ i2 → pγq). Whence, T ∗ proves the true Π1-sentence
∀z¬Proof(z, i1∧i2→pγq), and so T ∗ ` ∀z¬Ψ(i, z).
(3) Again we need to show T ∗ ` ∀u[¬Ψ(u, j)] for all j < m. Since T ∗ proves the true Π1-sentence
∀x, y, v, w[Proof(w, x∧y → v) → 〈x, y〉 < w] then T ∗ ` ∀u[Ψ(u, j) → u < j]. Since, by
an argument similar to that of (2) above, we can show that T ∗ ` ∀u < j[¬Ψ(u, j)], then
T ∗ ` ∀u∀z<m[¬Ψ(u, z)] holds too.
Whence, T ∗, and so T , is not Πn+1-deciding. Let us note that the above proof also shows that N |= γ. o
Note that Theorem 2.4 is Rosser’s Theorem for n = 0, and indeed one can feel that the above, rather long,
proof is in spirit more Rosserian (than Go¨delean) in the sense that the proof uses somehow Rosser’s Trick.
Corollary 2.5 No consistent Πn-definable and Πn-complete extension of Q can be Πn+1-deciding.
Proof. If T ⊇ Q + Πn-Th(N) is consistent and Πn-definable, then T + Πn-Th(N) is consistent, and so by
Theorem 2.4, T is not Πn+1-deciding. o
Corollary 2.6 No Πn-definable extension of Q can be Πn+1-deciding if it is n-consistent.
Corollary 2.6 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πn & n-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn+1-Deciding
Proof. Let T ⊇ Q be an n-consistent extension of Q such that AxiomsT ∈ Πn. If T is not Πn-deciding,
then there is nothing to prove. If T is Πn-deciding, then by Lemma 1.2 we have Πn-Th(N) ⊆ T , and so T
is consistent with Πn-Th(N). Thus, by Theorem 2.4, T is not Πn+1-deciding. o
Let us note that for a Πn-definable extension of Q (like T ) Corollary 1.3 implies the Πn+1-undecidability
(of T ) under the condition of (n + 2)-consistency (of T ) because AxiomsT ∈ Πn implies ProvT ∈ Πn+2;
while Corollary 2.6 derives the same conclusion (of the Πn+1-undecidability of T ) under the assumption
of n-consistency (of T ). So, we can argue that Theorem 2.4 somehow strengthens Theorem 2.5(2) of [1].
The following lemma, needed later, generalizes (and modifies) Craig’s Trick.
Lemma 2.7 Any Σn+1-definable (arithmetical) theory is equivalent with a Πn-definable theory.
Proof. If AxiomsT (x) = ∃x1 · · · ∃xnθ(x, x1, · · · , xn) with θ ∈ Πn then AxiomsT (x) ≡ ∃yθ′(x, y) with
θ′(x, y) = ∃x1 6 y · · · ∃xn 6 y θ(x, x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Πn. Now, T ′ = {ϕ ∧
(
k = k) | N |= θ′(pϕq, k)} is
equivalent with T and is Πn-definable by AxiomsT ′(x) ≡ ∃y, z6x
(
θ′(y, z) ∧ [x = (y ∧ pz=zq)]). o
Corollary 2.8 No Σn-definable (n > 0) extension of Q can be Πn-deciding if it is consistent with Πn-
Th(N).
Corollary 2.8 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & Con
(
T + Πn-Th(N)
)
=⇒ T 6∈ Πn-Deciding
Proof. For n = 1 this is Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. Suppose that n > 1, and that AxiomsT ∈ Σn
for some T ⊇ Q such that T +Πn-Th(N) is consistent. By Lemma 2.7 there exists a Πn−1-definable theory
T ′ equivalent with T . Now, T ′ contains Q, is Πn−1-definable, and is consistent with Πn−1-Th(N) (because
T is consistent with Πn-Th(N)). Thus, by Theorem 2.4 the theory T ′ is not Πn-deciding; neither is T . o
Actually, the consistency of T with Πn−1-Th(N) suffices for the above proof to go through.
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Corollary 2.9 No Σn-definable extension of Q can be Πn-deciding if it is consistent with Πn−1-Th(N). q
Corollary 2.9 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & Con
(
T + Πn−1-Th(N)
)
=⇒ T 6∈ Πn-Deciding
By Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem no 1-consistent and Σ1-definable extension of Q can be Π1-
deciding; another generalization of this theorem is the Πn-undecidability of any n-consistent and Σn-
definable extension of Q.
Corollary 2.10 No Σn-definable extension of Q can be Πn-deciding if it is n-consistent.
Corollary 2.10 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & n-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn-Deciding
Proof. By Lemma 2.7 any Σn-definable theory is equivalent with a Πn−1-definable theory, and if that
theory is (n−1)-consistent, then (extending Q) it cannot be Πn-deciding by Corollary 2.6. o
In fact, we can prove even a more general theorem here: no (n−1)-consistent and Σn-definable extension
of Q can be Πn-deciding (because what was used in the above proof was the (n−1)-consistency of the
theory); this is actually a generalization of Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem.
Corollary 2.11 No Σn-definable extension of Q can be Πn-deciding if it is (n−1)-consistent. o
Corollary 2.11 : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & (n−1)-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn-Deciding
3 Rosser’s Theorem Optimized
Rosser’s Trick is one of the most fruitful tricks in Mathematical Logic and Recursion Theory (cf. [15]).
One of its uses is getting rid of the condition of ω-consistency (or 1-consistency or equivalently consistency
with the set of true Π1-sentences) from the hypothesis of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. Thus,
Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem (see e.g. [2, 13, 15]) can be depicted as:
Go¨del–Rosser (1936) : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Π1-Deciding
In the light of our above mentioned results it is natural to expect a generalization of this theorem to higher
levels (to Σn or Πn definable theories); alas (by the following theorem for n = 0) there can bo no such
generalization for Rosser’s Theorem.
Theorem 3.1 There exists a complete (and consistent) and Σn+2-definable extension of Q + Πn-Th(N).
Proof. That there exists a complete Σ2-definable extension of Q is almost a classical fact; see [14]. Here,
we generalize this result to Q+ Πn-Th(N). Let the theory S be Q when n = 0 and be Q+ Πn-Th(N) when
n > 0 (note that Π0-Th(N) ⊆ Q). Theory S can be completed by Lindenbaum’s Lemma as follows: for an
enumeration of all the sentences ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · take T0 = S, and let Tn+1 = Tn + ϕn if Con(Tn + ϕn) and
let Tn+1 = Tn + ¬ϕ otherwise [if ¬Con(Tn + ϕn)]. Then the theory T ∗ =
⋃
n∈N Tn is a complete extension
of S; below we show the Σn+2-definability of T
∗. An enumeration of all the sentences can be defined by a
Σ0-formula such as the following expression for “x is the (Go¨del number of the) u
th sentence”:
Sent-List(x, u) =
[
Sent(u) ∧ x = u] ∨ [¬Sent(u) ∧ x = p0 = 0q].
Now, AxiomsT ∗(x) can be defined by the following formula:
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∃y
[
Seq(y) ∧ [y]`en(y)−1 = x ∧
(∀u<`en(y)[Sent([y]u)])∧
∀u<`en(y)∀z6y
((
Sent-List(z, u) ∧ Con′(S + 〈y u〉+ z) −→ [y]u = z
)∧(
Sent-List(z, u) ∧ ¬Con′(S + 〈y u〉+ z) −→ [y]u = ¬z
))]
,
which is Σn+2 because the following formula (where q is the Go¨del code of the conjunction of all the
[finitely many] axioms of Q and ⊥ = [0 6= 0])
Con′(S+〈y u〉+z) ≡
{
∀v, w[ConjSeq(v, 〈y u〉)→¬Proof(w, q∧v∧z→ p⊥q)] if n=0
∀t, v, w[Πn-True(t)∧ConjSeq(v, 〈y u〉)→¬Proof(w, q∧t∧v∧z→ p⊥q)] if n>0
is Πn+1 since Πn-True ∈ Πn (and ConjSeq,Proof∈Π0). o
3.1 Comparing Σn-Soundness with n-Consistency
The assumptions on the theory T used in Corollaries 2.8 and 2.10, other than Q ⊆ T&AxiomsT ∈Σn, are
either consistency with the set of all true Πn sentences (or equivalently, Σn-soundness) or n-consistency of
T (cf. also Corollaries 2.9 and 2.11). So, it is desirable to compare the assumptions of Σn-soundness and
n-consistency used in these results.
Proposition 3.2 (1) If a theory is Σn-sound, then it is n-consistent.
(2) If a Σn−1-complete theory is n-consistent, then it is Σn-sound.
Proof. (1) Assume T ` ∃xψ(x) for some Σn-sound theory T and some formula ψ ∈ Πn−1. By the Σn-
soundness of T , N |= ∃xψ(x), and so N |= ψ(m) for some m ∈ N. Now, ψ(m) ∈ Πn−1-Th(N), and again
by the Σn-soundness of T we have T 6` ¬ψ(m).
(2) Assume T ` ∃xψ(x) for some Σn−1-complete and n-consistent theory T and some formula
ψ ∈ Πn−1. By n-consistency, there exists some m ∈ N such that T 6` ¬ψ(m). By Σn−1-completeness,
N 6|= ¬ψ(m); and so N |= ψ(m), whence N |= ∃xψ(x). o
Remark 3.3 In fact, for n = 0, 1, 2 the notions of Σn-soundness and n-consistency are equivalent for Σ1-
complete theories (see Theorems 5,25,30 of [3]); but for n>3, n-consistency does not imply Σn-soundness.
Even, ω-consistency does not imply Σ3-soundness (see Theorem 19 of [3] proved by Kreisel in 1955).
Generally, Σn-soundness does not imply (n+ 1)-consistency: Let γ be the true Πn+1-sentence constructed
in Theorem 2.4 for the theory Q + Πn-Th(N) and put S = T + ¬γ. Now, S is Σn-sound and not (n+ 1)-
consistent, since for ¬γ = ∃xδ(x) ∈ Σn+1 we have S ` ∃xδ(x) and for any k ∈ N we have S ` ¬δ(k) since
S is Σn+1-complete by Remark 2.3 and ¬δ(k) ∈ Σn+1-Th(N) (because, if N 6|= ¬δ(k) then N |= δ(k) and
so N |= ¬γ contradiction!). G
Σ0-Sound ⇐= Σ1-Sound ⇐= Σ2-Sound ⇐= Σ3-Sound ⇐= · · ·Σn-Sound · · · ⇐= Sound
m m m ⇓ ⇓ 6↖ ⇓
Consistent⇐= 1-Consistent⇐= 2-Consistent⇐= 3-Consistent⇐= · · ·n-Consistent · · · ⇐= ω-Consistent
Corollary 3.4 (1) There exists a complete extension of Q which is Σn+2-definable and consistent with
Πn-Th(N) (and so n-consistent).
(2) There exists a complete extension of Q which is Πn+1-definable and consistent with
Πn-Th(N) (and so n-consistent).
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Corollary 3.4(1) : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn+2 &
[
Con
(
T + Πn-Th(N)
)∨
n-Con(T )
] 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
Corollary 3.4(2) : Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πn+1 &
[
Con
(
T + Πn-Th(N)
)∨
n-Con(T )
] 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
Proof. (1) The Σn+2-definable and complete extension of Q in Theorem 3.1 contains Πn-Th(N), and so,
being Σn-sound, is n-consistent by Proposition 3.2.
(2) The Σn+2-definable theory of part (1) is equivalent with a Πn+1-definable theory by Lemma 2.7. o
3.2 A Note on the Constructiveness of the Proofs
It is interesting to note that for n>3 all the incompleteness proofs (presented here) with the assumption
of Σn-soundness are constructive (i.e., the independent sentence can be effectively constructed from the
given Σn-sound theory satisfying the conditions of Σn/Πn definability), while all the incompleteness proofs
(here) with the assumption of n-consistency are all non-constructive (i.e., the independent sentence is not
constructed explicitly, and only its mere existence is proved). Our final result contains a bit of a surprise:
even though the proof of Corollary 2.11 is not constructive, no one can present a constructive proof for it.
Theorem 3.5 (Non-Constructivity of n-Consistency Incompleteness) Let n>3 be fixed. There is
no recursive function f (even with the oracle ∅(n)) such that when m is a (Go¨del code of a) Σn+1-formula
which defines an n-consistent extension of Q, then f(m) is a (Go¨del code of a) Πn+1-sentence independent
from that theory.
Proof. Assume that there is an ∅(n)-recursive function f such that for any given Σn+1-formula Ψ(x) if the
theory TΨ = {α | N |= Ψ(pαq)} is an n-consistent extension of Q then f(pΨq) is (the Go¨del code of) a
Πn+1-sentence such that TΨ 6` f(pΨq) and TΨ 6` ¬f(pΨq). The ω-consistency of Q with x can be written
by the Π3-formula ω-ConQ(x) = ∀χ
[∃zProof(z, q∧x→∃vχ(v))→ ∃v∀z¬Proof(z, q∧x→¬χ(v))], where q
is the Go¨del code of the conjunction of the finitely many axioms of Q (see the Proof of Theorem 3.1). By
∅(n)-recursiveness of f the expressions y=f(x) and f(z)↓ can be written by Σn+1-formulas (see e.g. [9]).
By Diagonal Lemma there exists some Σn+1-formula Θ(x) such that
Θ(x) ≡ [f(pΘq)↓ ∧ ω-ConQ(f(pΘq)) ∧ (x=f(pΘq) ∨ x=q)] ∨[
f(pΘq)↓ ∧ ¬ω-ConQ
(
f(pΘq)
) ∧ (x=¬f(pΘq) ∨ x=q)] ∨
(x = q).
Now, if f(pΘq)↑ then Θ(x) ≡ (x=q) and so TΘ =Q is an n-consistent extension of Q, whence f(pΘq)↓;
contradiction. Thus, f(pΘq)↓. If Q ∪ {f(pΘq)} is ω-consistent then we have Θ(x) ≡ (x=f(pΘq)∨ x=q)
and so TΘ = Q ∪ {f(pΘq)} is an n-consistent extension of Q, whence f(pΘq) should be independent from
it; contradiction. So, Q ∪ {f(pΘq)} is not ω-consistent; then by [3, Theorem 21] (which states that for
any ω-consistent theory S and any sentence X either S ∪ {X} or S ∪ {¬X} is ω-consistent) the theory
Q ∪ {¬f(pΘq)} should be ω-consistent. But in this case we have Θ(x) ≡ (x=¬f(pΘq) ∨ x= q) and so
TΘ = Q ∪ {¬f(pΘq)} is an n-consistent extension of Q, whence f(pΘq) should be independent from it;
contradiction again. Thus there can be no such ∅(n)-recursive function. o
Remark 3.6 (Optimality of Theorem 3.5) Even though, by Theorem 3.5, there does not exist any
∅(n)-recursive function (for n > 2) which can output an independent Πn+1-sentence for a given Σn+1-
definable and n-consistent extension of Q, there indeed exists some ∅(n+1)-recursive function which can
find such an independent Πn+1-sentence (for a given Σn+1-definition of an n-consistent extension of Q): By
having an access to the oracle ∅(n+1) for a given AxT ∈Σn+1, provability (or unprovability) in T of a given
sentence is decidable; thus (since by Corollary 2.11 there must exist some Πn+1-sentence independent from
the theory T ) by an exhaustive search through all the Πn+1-sentences such an independent sentence can
be eventually found. G
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4 Conclusions
Summing up, Go¨del first incompleteness theorem in its semantic form, which states the Π1-incompleteness
of any sound and Σ1-definable extension of Q, can be generalized to show that any sound and Σn-definable
extension of Q is Πn-incomplete. Also, Go¨del’s original first incompleteness theorem, which is equivalent
to the Π1-undecidability of any Σ1-sound and Σ1-definable extension of Q, can be generalized to show
that no Σn-sound and Σn-definable extension of Q is Πn-deciding (here actually Σn−1-soundness suffices
by Rosser’s Trick). Finally, Rosser’s incompleteness theorem, which states the Π1-undecidability of any
consistent and Σ1-definable extension of Q, cannot be generalized to definable theories, not even to Π1-
definable ones. Concluding, we have the following table for n> 1 which shows our results in a viewable
perspective:
Go¨del’s 1st (Semantic) Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & T is (Σ∞)Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Π1−Complete
Theorem 2.1 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & T is (Σ∞)Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−Complete
Go¨del’s 1st Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & T is Σ1−Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Π1−Deciding
Corollary 2.8 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & T is Σn−Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−Deciding
Go¨del–Rosser Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & T is Σ0−Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Π1−Deciding
Corollary 2.9 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & T is Σn−1 Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−Deciding
Corollary 3.4(1) Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & T is Σn−2 Sound 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
Go¨del’s 1st Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & 1-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Π1−Deciding
Corollary 2.10 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & n-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−Deciding
Go¨del–Rosser Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σ1 & Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Π1−Deciding
Corollary 2.11 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & (n−1)-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πn−Deciding
Corollary 3.4(1) Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Σn & (n−2)-Con(T ) 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
To complete the picture here are the Π version of the results for m>0:
Theorem 2.4 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πm & T is Σm−Sound =⇒ T 6∈ Πm+1−Deciding
Corollary 3.4(2) Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πm & T is Σm−1 Sound 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
Corollary 2.6 Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πm & m-Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Πm+1−Deciding
Corollary 3.4(2) Q ⊆ T & AxiomsT ∈Πm & (m−1)-Con(T ) 6=⇒ T 6∈ Complete
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